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Abstract
In this paper, we take a novel approach to study the empirical relationship between
public debate in the media and asylum acceptance rates in Europe from 2002–2016.
In theory, an asylum seeker should experience the same likelihood of being granted
refugee status from each of the 20 European countries we study. Yet, in practice,
acceptance rates vary widely for nearly every asylum country of origin. We address
this inconsistency with a data-driven approach by analyzing refugee-related news
articles and data on asylum decisions across 20 Europe countries for more than 100
asylum seekers’ countries of origin. We find that: (i) public debate sentiment in the
media is strongly associated with European countries’ diverging asylum practices,
much more so than social, cultural or economic factors, and (ii) by combining
different measures of public debate we can make out-of-sample predictions within
3% of true acceptance rates (on average). We conclude by discussing the practical
implications of our findings for European asylum practices.
Keywords: Public debate in the media; Asylum acceptance rates; Granger-causality
1 Introduction
The European refugee crisis—a term used by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and widely adopted by the media to describe the influx of asylum
seekers into Europe in 2015—has played a prominent role in EU politics. For example,
“Take back control” was a phrase used by Brexiteers to express the campaign goal of help-
ing the UK take back control over immigration policies. Chancellor of Germany Angela
Merkel was strongly criticized for easing the entry of asylum seekers into Germany. Swe-
den was noted for its positive attitude toward asylum seekers, accepting four refugees per
one thousand citizens (the highest in Europe); Hungary, on the other hand, built a fence
on its eastern boarder to mitigate the entrance of asylum seekers.
In theory, an asylum seeker should experience the same likelihood of being granted
refugee status based on international laws. However, as the above examples suggest, the
reality is that asylumpractices have variedwidely across European countries. There has in-
deed been considerable debate about how Europe has and should respond to the increased
inflow of asylum seekers. But it remains unclear whether or not this public debate has in-
deed impacted national-level asylum practices in Europe, and whether this can account
for the stark variation in actual asylum acceptance rates.
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To study this question, we take a novel data-driven approach that incorporates a large
database of refugee-related news articles and data on asylum decisions across 20 Euro-
pean countries for more than 100 asylum countries of origin. We draw the news article
data from GDELT [1, 2], which is one of the world’s largest databases for news reporting
on a broad spectrum of events. In particular, it includes coverage from a diverse set of
newspapers for each European language. The scope and breadth of this database allow
us to define various measures that capture different aspects of public debate in the me-
dia. The data on asylum decisions is drawn directly from the official EU database [3]. In
addition, we enrich our statistical analysis by incorporating socio-economic and political
controls that have been known to influence national-level asylumdecisions [4, 5]. The data
cover approximately 55,000 observations of asylum acceptance rates, endowed with a rich
set of controls and indexed according to time, European country and asylum country of
origin. It should be noted that the distinct country-level perspective taken in this paper of-
fers some advantages: (i) we have access to a considerable amount of data, (ii) we can take
a Europe-wide perspective in our analysis, which allows us to compare, for example, the
UK and Spain, and (iii) we can study the influence of public debate while controlling for
key country-specific socio-economic covariates and important explanatory factors such
as refugees’ countries of origin. These are novel features of our data-driven approach, and
we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to combine a big dataset of refugee-related
news articles with official EU asylum statistics.
We approach our research question from three specific perspectives. First, we study the
extent to which public debate can predict European asylum practices. Second, we test
whether public debate is a better predictor for political change than other mechanisms.
Finally, we analyze the causal structure between public debate and European asylum prac-
tices.
Our analysis reveals four key empirical insights. First, we show that public debate in the
media on refugee-related topics has indeed varied widely across Europe, and this variation
can explain the substantial variance observed in asylum acceptance practices. When we
look at different measures, we find that the overall sentiment of public debate is what in-
fluences asylumpractices: negative/positivemedia sentiment associateswith lower/higher
acceptance rates. Other measures, such as the volume of refugee-related news coverage,
i.e., media attention, are less important. Second, by combining different measures of pub-
lic debate, we canmake out-of-sample predictions within 3% of true European acceptance
rates (on average). Third, we show that public debate in the media is a better predictor of
national-level asylum practices than social, cultural and economic factors captured in our
dataset. Finally, by looking at the causal structure of public debate and asylum practices,
we find that public debate strongly influences asylum acceptance rates while the reverse
effect is statistically negligible. Taken together, our findings thus highlight the prominent
role that public debate in the media plays in national-level policy practices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide further back-
ground on European asylum practices and review the relevant literature. In Sect. 3, we
discuss the datasets underlying our analyses. In Sect. 4, we test the relationship between
public debate in the media and European asylum acceptance rates by making in-sample
and out-of-sample predictions. In Sect. 5, we study the causal structure of public debate in
themedia and asylum acceptance rates via Granger-causality tests. In Sect. 6, we conclude
by discussing avenues for future work.
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2 Background and literature review
This section first provides some historical background and information on current asylum
practices. We then give an overview of the relevant literature in order to provide context
and to situate the contributions of this paper in the broader scholarship on this topic.
Readers who are mainly interested in our data analysis may continue to Sect. 3.
2.1 Historical background
FollowingWorldWar II, the international political landscape changed with the creation of
intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations and the International Mon-
etary Fund [6, 7]. These organizations, unprecedented at their time, were the first truly
international governing bodies tasked with establishing peaceful coexistence of nations
and promoting prosperity. Of all the accomplishments that followed, one of the most im-
portant was theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United
Nations in December 1948 and formed the basis of subsequent international treaties, eco-
nomic agreements, regional human rights, and national constitutions [8–11]. Article 14,
in particular, commenced international refugee law as it established the right of any per-
son to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. This article was later elaborated
at the more well-known 1951 Geneva Convention, which further spelled out the rights of
refugees and the responsibilities of countries that grant asylum [12, 13] (while the original
intention was to protect post-WWII European refugees, the 1967 Protocol expanded the
Geneva Convention’s scope to asylum seekers internationally).
Nearly seventy years later, the 1951 Geneva Convention continues to provide a political
mandate for one of the most pressing refugee situations since WWII. Currently, over 20
countries are affected by conflicts with major internal displacement, resulting in a total of
67 million forcibly displaced people—almost one in every 115 humans [14]. Europe has
received a particularly large influx of asylum seekers: protracted conflicts in North Africa,
the Middle East, and recently Syria have resulted in millions of asylum seekers coming to
Europe to seek refugee status (we plot the influx in Fig. 1; see also [15]).a The refugee sit-
uation has created a divisive political environment, particularly in Europe, where there is
large disagreement about howmuch support can and should be offered to asylum seekers.b
2.2 Current asylum practices
According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, the general guideline for granting someone
asylum is establishing that he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,” (see, e.g., [16]). This
means that, in theory, asylum seekers from a common country of origin should experi-
ence no heterogeneity in the likelihood of being granted ‘refugee’ status regardless of the
country to which they apply.
Yet, in practice, asylum acceptance rates have varied widely across Europe. In Fig. 2,
we plot the cross-sectional variation in asylum acceptance rates across the 20 European
countries in our study. The starkly different asylum practices are readily apparent.c For ex-
ample, acceptance rates for Afghanistan asylum seekers—who submitted themost asylum
applications from 2002–16—ranged from 15 to 75% across Europe. From 2002–2007, the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo prompted more than 60,000 of its citi-
zens to apply for asylum in Europe, and between 10 and 75% of applications were accepted
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Figure 1 Graphical illustration of our European asylum data. (a) Distribution of asylum applications across
Europe: red shades indicate the number of applications received at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’ in
2014–15. (b) Quarterly time series of applications received 2002–2016. Gray shading indicates the total
number of first-time asylum applications received by the 20 European countries included in our study. Only
countries that accepted substantial proportions of asylum seekers are shown in stacked bars
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Figure 2 Cross sectional variation in asylum acceptance rates across Europe. The x-axis lists the top-15
countries who submitted asylum applications in Europe from 2002–16 (in alphabetical order). Each black dot
represents 1 (out of 20) European countries in our study
Figure 3 Time evolution of asylum acceptance rates. Time evolution of asylum acceptance rates in Germany,
the UK, and Sweden for three asylum seekers’ countries of origin: (top) Afghanistan, (middle) Iraq, and
(bottom) Syria
across Europe. More recently, acceptance rates for the massive influx of Syrian citizens re-
questing asylum ranged from27 to 70%. In Fig. 3, we show that this variation is also evident
if we look at the time-evolution of asylum acceptance rates: for the same asylum country
Koch et al. EPJ Data Science            ( 2020)  9:12 Page 6 of 27
of origin, month-to-month acceptance rates can drastically change for different European
countries.
How is it possible that, despite the 1951 Geneva Convention, asylum acceptance rates
across Europe differ so significantly? One source of this variation is the legal ambiguity of
keywords in the definition of a refugee, such as “well-founded” and “persecuted”. These
words give countries leeway in deciding whether the merit of an asylum seeker’s claim
matches the country’s interpretation of refugee [5, 17], which ultimately gives rise to each
country’s acceptance policies and practices. However, this continues to beg the question:
why, then, are countries’ legal interpretations of a “refugee” so different across Europe?
These observations are particularly interesting when seen in light of a recent large-scale
survey conducted by Bansak et al. [18], who asked 18,000 general citizens across 15 Euro-
pean countries to ‘mock’ review a total of 180,000 asylum applications. The survey found
that if European citizens reviewed asylum applications—rather than civil servants who
process asylum applications based on mandates from governmental authorities—the dif-
ferences in asylum acceptance rates would be insignificant compared to those observed in
practice: “despite the major differences between the countries, there is a considerable con-
sensus in terms of not only the types but also the overall number of asylum seekers that
should be admitted,” ([18], p. 219). The surveys revealed that asylum applicants with high
vocation prospects, consistent oppression stories, andwho are Christian rather thanMus-
lim received the highest public support.
For all European countries in our study, there thus appears to exist both the same legal
mandate and a Europe-wide citizen consensus toward refugees. However, national-level
asylum practices have varied widely across Europe. Empirically studying this dichotomy
is the main motivation of this paper.
2.3 Prior work on the role of public debate in the media
In this paper, we turn to an explanation that has yet to be explored in the research liter-
ature: the extent to which public debate in the media shaped national-level asylum prac-
tices. The media, sometimes called “The Fourth Branch of Government” [19–21], is an
institution often viewed as providing a public check on the branches of government. Me-
dia is also often viewed as a forum in which public debate on key political issues can take
place. Past research has identified different key drivers that shape public debate in the
media, such as the media’s own political agenda [22], media moguls [23], public opin-
ion [24] and governments engendering public support for policies [25–27]. Beyond the
idiosyncratic drivers of public debate in the media, past literature has identified various
situations in which public debate in the media has taken an active, and often successful,
role in shaping presidential agendas [28] and electoral outcomes [29]. However, we are not
interested in how public debate in the media influences electoral outcomes per se; we are
instead interested in the empirical link with actual policy practices.
It is worth noting that, in the literature, there is an important debate about conditions
under which the media takes an active versus passive role in shaping political outcomes,
which is sometimes respectively called media power versus media capture [30]. Because
we study 20 European countries, which represent a broad spectrum of different political
systems, we cannot take a definitive stance about active versus passive role of the me-
dia because it is likely to differ across countries and for each news media outlet. For the
moment, we focus on the media as a mechanism that could play various roles, which is
Koch et al. EPJ Data Science            ( 2020)  9:12 Page 7 of 27
without loss of generality for much of the analysis. We take up this discussion again in
more detail when we analyze each European country individually.
Why might we expect public debate in the media to have an impact on national-level
asylum practices in Europe? Several reasons from past literature point us in this direction.
The first is that the European refugee crisis has dominated public debate in the media
for the past several years, featuring diverse and often highly polarized opinions, and em-
pirical research has found that politicians are sensitive to this kind of coverage. At one
side of the spectrum, pro-refugee news articles have tried to garner support by getting
readers to sympathize with humanitarian tragedies of failed treks across the Mediter-
ranean Sea [31, 32]. At the other side, articles opposed to refugees have tended to politi-
cize their presence—particularly that of young men—by depicting them as “problems”
and “invaders” [33]. The second reason is that if public debate in the media reflects citi-
zens’ preferences—whose votesmight be needed in the next election—ormediamoguls—
whose financial support might be needed in the next election—then political actors might
have an incentive to respond to such debate accordingly. Finally, the third reason is that
a country’s asylum decisions have public and visible consequences, which can increase a
political actor’s sensitivity to public discontent expressed in the media [34].d
It should be noted that our hypothesis—namely thatmedia coveragematters for the asy-
lum seekers’ fates—stands in stark contrast to the principles and goals of the 1951 Geneva
Convention (see, e.g., [35] and [36]). A refugee claim is made at the individual-applicant
level: “. . . any requirements . . . which the particular individual would have to fulfill for the
enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him,” (1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 6). This claim must also be backed by
reasonable evidence that, if this asylum seeker returned to his/her country of origin, then
this person would be the target of persecution.e However, our hypothesis suggests that
asylum decisions are not made vis-à-vis the individual but are influenced by perceptions
of refugee-seeking groups as a whole [37]: “the individual asylum seeker who is escaping
persecution is undermined by association with this ostensibly threatening collective,” ([35],
p. 462).f In the same vein, [38] found that “threat”, “others”, “illegality”, and “burden” are the
four words most closely associated with asylum seekers in newspapers—if our hypothesis
is correct, then such words can negatively impact an individual asylum seeker’s claim for
refugee status.
Perhaps one of the most important means of disseminating public debate in the news is
social media, and scholars agree that such platforms have “. . . increasing social, economic
and political importance” [39]. A number of studies have shown that individuals experi-
ence a sense of self-gratification by sharing news on social media [40–42]. In addition to
suppliers of news, social media is the key means by which individuals consume news in-
formation, whether or not this is intentional or incidental [43–46]. While the debate on
how social media affects news dissemination is still ongoing, one dynamic that has rel-
evance for our study is that social media has been found to polarize those news that do
end up in public debate. For example, a recent study in Finland found that social media
over-emphasized news articles with crime and threat-oriented themes on refugee issues,
while positive articles about refugees where under-emphasized [47].
3 Data
This study leverages twomain data sources: (i) a big dataset of refugee-related articles and
(ii) official European asylum statistics. We describe both in detail below.
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3.1 Media data: GDELT
Data The first challenge is to represent public debate in the media empirically. To this
end, our analysis utilizes a big data repertoire of news articles called the Global Database
of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT; [1, 2]).g GDELT is a recent database that includes
international and national news coverage from nearly every major online news source (we
include a list in Additional file 1). GDELT has been shown to be more comprehensive
than other well-known and utilized news article databases, such as ICEWS [48]. Further-
more, GDELT offers updated and sophisticated algorithms, including language transla-
tions, which are critical for our analysis. Below, we only highlight the aspects of GDELT
that are most pertinent to our analysis; other relevant details are relegated to Additional
file 1.
GDELT organizes news articles according to news events, which is crucial for enabling
us to build measures capturing the characteristics of refugee-related news coverage. To
clarify what this means, it is useful to consider an excerpt from a news article that is in-
cluded in GDELT:
Example ([49]) “The United Nations will provide nearly 25,000 tons of emergency
food aid to refugees fleeing the civil war in Liberia, the World Food Program (WFP)
said on Monday.”
Importantly, GDELT performs what it calls a “principle-actor decomposition analysis”.
This means that it identifies (1) who is the main actor, (2) what action this actor is tak-
ing, and (3) who is the recipient of this action. Concretely, in the above sentence GDELT
identified that (1) the United Nations (2) will provide food aid (3) to Liberian refugees. For
notation, denote this event as
{United Nations, will provide food aid, Liberian refugees}.
In fact, the principle-actor decomposition analysis is able to abstract beyond specific
actors representing a certain country (or its government). This makes it uniquely suitable
to construct our country-specific measures of public debate in the media. To showcase
this, consider the following excerpt from a 2015 BBC article in the GDELT database:
Example from a 2015 BBC article included in the GDELT database:h David Cameron
announced on Monday that the UK will accept up to 20,000 refugees from camps sur-
rounding Syria.
According to the GDELT algorithm, this event is first identified as
{David Cameron, will accept, Syrian refugees}.
The GDELT algorithm then checks against a dynamically updating database that codifies
the country associated with each event. Given that David Cameron is associated with the
UK, the example above is codified as
{UK, will accept, refugees}.
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The event {UK, will accept, refugees} is then entered into the GDELT database with a
date of 08/09/2015 as well as the exact time the article was found.
As mentioned before, the database is fundamentally structured around such news
events. Specifically, GDELT codes all other articles that within a fifteen minute time win-
dow cover the same event, i.e., {UK, will accept, refugees} still as part of the same news
event. From this it then builds two measures for this news event that are of particular
interest to us:
(1) the number of articlesi covering this particular news event and
(2) the average sentiment of these articles.j
The average sentiment score is calculated using a standard dictionary-based sentiment al-
gorithm [50, 51].While perhaps simplistic on the surface, this sentimentmeasure has been
shown to be comparable to human-coded sentiment scores, and it performs comparable
to many other state-of-the-art sentiment measures [52].
The data provided by GDELT thus enables us to build country-specific measures for
public debate in the media based on their coverage of refugee related events. If we want
to find a measure for the attention spent on refugee related issues in, e.g. France in March
2015, then we can parse GDELT for all events and count the number of times that articles
mention refugee related events. Similar we can use themeasures for the average sentiment
of each news event recorded by GDELT to determine how sentiment of refugee-related
media coverage has changed over time. We expand on both below when we describe the
measures used for our main analyses.
In addition to the article-specific analyses, perhaps the greatest advantage of GDELT
is its size and scope. It is known that major news outlets target news audiences [53].
News outlets also have idiosyncratic factors that influence its content, such as geograph-
ical reach, political ideology and profit incentives [29, 54]. Our goal is to build empiri-
cal variables that capture the debate that results from all of these idiosyncratic features;
without the comprehensive nature of GDELT, we could otherwise miss some major news
outlets that play an important role. It is also known that both national and international
news coverage can influence domestic public debate [55]. Again, GDELT gives us a way to
capture both levels of news coverage.
We plot in Fig. 4 the volume of refugee-event related news coverage for Sweden and
the United Kingdom resulting from our filter approach described above. As expected, the
volume increases during the refugee crisis of 2014–16. However, the absolute volumemay
be skewed because of changes in the total number of news article published over time,
changes in Google News filters, etc. Therefore, in our analyses we normalize our measure
of media attention by always considering coverage of refugee-related relative to all events
covered in GDELT for each country (see below for details).
Metrics on public debate in the media We define three general metrics that, on the one
hand, leverage the scope of our data and, on the other hand, are subtle enough to detect
relevant changes in public debate about refugees. To formally introduce our measures, let
Eit = {all refugee related events about country i in time period t},
where a time period t will typically be a month or quarter (both are used in the analyses
below). Note that these are events as captured by GDELT. For each event Eit ∈ Eit , let
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Figure 4 Time evolution of news volume on the European refugee crisis. The dotted and solid lines
correspond to the number of times articles in GDELT mention refugee-related news events concerning the
UK and Sweden, respectively, from 2000–16
(1) N(Eit) denote the number of articles that mention event Eit and
(2) S(Eit) denote the average tone of all articles that mention event Eit .
It is also useful to define
Cit = {all events about country i in time period t}
as the set of refugee and non-refugee related news events for country i (which means that
Eit ⊆ Cit). The set Cit allows us to build measures with respect to a baseline.
As our first quantitative measure, we define media attention as the number of times










This measure is built for each country i and time period t. A similar metric is used in [28],
who studied whether radio attention influences US presidential agendas (see also [56]).
Our second and third quantitativemeasures focus on the content of the articles covering
specific news events. We here leverage the GDELT sentiment scores described above and

















where (2) represents the average sentiment of all refugee-related coverage for country i at
time period t, and (3) represents the average sentiment of refugee-related coverage relative
to the average sentiment of all events (similar metrics can be found in [57].) Note that
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Figure 5 Measure of public debate in the media across Europe. Illustration of public debate sentiment and
attention in the media on refugees from 2002–2016 for each European country in our study.Media attention:
relative number of articles covering refugee-related vs. other events in a given country.Media sentiment: the
mean sentiment of refugee-related events minus the mean sentiment of all events in a given country. Formal
definitions provided in the main text
|Cit| denoted the cardinality of Cit . Measuring sentiment against a country-level baseline
is important because baseline sentiment varies across countries and languages.
It is worth noting that our sentimentmetrics benefit from themassive volume of articles
captured in the GDLET dataset. Certainly, the sentiment measure of a single article is
subject to noise and error. But by generating a sentiment measure from tens of thousands
of articles, we average over such noise and acquire a robust ‘averaged sentiment’ metric.
Illustration of public debate in themedia With thesemetrics, the large variation of public
debate in themedia on refugees across Europe is evident in our dataset. Figure 5 shows the
averagemedia sentiment and attention per year for each country in our study. In 2015—the
year with the most asylum applications in Europe in the past 40 years—the refugee crisis
dominated media coverage with five times more mentions in news articles than any pre-
ceding year; this is in contrast to 2003, when Europe also saw peaking numbers of refugees,
but reporting remained relatively small. One can observe a similar trend in sentiment. In
2015, the sentiment of public debate in the media was clearly negative across Europe (see
dark colors in Fig. 5), while sentiment varied greatly across Europe in 2003. Another per-
haps striking observation is the different trends across Europe: while media sentiment and
attention toward the refugee crisis in the UK remained relatively constant, countries such
as Denmark, Estonia and Hungary experienced large shifts from year to year.
These metrics intentionally break-down the complexity of what constitutes ‘public de-
bate in themedia’ to provide rather simple indicators. Yet, as we show below, thesemetrics
are sufficient to provide considerable predictive power of European asylum acceptance
rates.
3.2 Asylum data
Empirical data on European asylum practices is drawn from the official EU database [3]
from which we obtain each country’s number of incoming, accepted, and rejected asylum
applications by country of origin; the data is availablemonthly from2002–07 and quarterly
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from 2008–16.k In total, our dataset consists of 20 European countries, more than 100
refugee sending countries, and 60 time period (quarters).
All asylum data in our study concern individuals who have formally submitted an appli-
cation for international protection (or who have been included in such an application as a
family member). It should be noted that our statistics do not include or concern refugees
who did not submit asylum applications because (i) such statistics are not relevant for pre-
dicting or explaining country-specific asylum acceptance rates and (ii) no such data exist.
Asylum acceptance rate The dependent variable in our analysis is each European coun-
try’s asylum acceptance rate. Below, we describe how the acceptance rate is defined.
From the EU database, we have information regarding the total number of asylum ap-
plications accepted each quarter (depending on the year).l According to the 1951 Geneva
Convention, an asylum application is accepted if and only if the individual is “someone who
is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion” (see, e.g., [16]).m
The EUdatabase also has information regarding the total number of asylum applications
rejected each quarter. Taken together, we thus know the fraction of asylum applications





where i represents the European receiving country, j represents the asylum country of
origin, and t represents the time period. Whenever Acceptedijt + Rejectedijt = 0, we drop
this observation from our data.
3.3 Control variables
Refugee inflow In our analysis, it is important to control for the “floodgate” effect that has
been pointed out in the literature [37, 58]. This effect amounts to asylum acceptance rates
decreasing (or increasing) because of the volume of applicants coming, owing to reasons
such as physical and/or financial constraints of a country. We thus include in our analysis
the total number of first-time asylum applicants, which are asylum seekers who apply for
refugee status internationally for the first-time (e.g. an asylum seeker who was denied in
Germany and re-applied in France is not considered a first-time applicant). This variable
is indexed with respect to asylum country of origin, recipient European country, and time
period.
Economic indicators There is empirical evidence that governments may increase or de-
crease acceptance rates based on labor demand, economic progress and stability [5].
Therefore, we include national GDP, unemployment rate, consumer price index, and gov-
ernment debt as control variables in our analysis (all from the official EU database; see Ad-
ditional file 1 for more information). As detailed below, we include (i) a between-country
version of these variables to account for structural differences in the economic and insti-
tutional capacity to accept applicants and (ii) a within-country version to account for the
changing economic environments that governments face.
We include two final measures to control for additional relevant dynamics that could
confound our results.
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Press freedom index Thefirst accounts for the freedomwithwhich public debate can take
place in themedia. In general, newspapers are not entirely free when it comes to what they
can and cannot publish, especially pertaining to European refugee policies. Any censor-
ship as such could bias our results, as it could take away from the true public debate that
is happening in a country. Therefore, we include the “Press Freedom Index” developed by
the organization ReportersWithout Borders (https://rsf.org/en/). Themeasure is based on
a questionnaire given to reporters around the world that asks about media independence,
transparency, legislative infrastructure, et cetera—in line with what we want to control,
this measure captures journalists’ perception of press freedom.
Governmental ideology The second measure included in our analyses accounts for each
European government’s ideology. Based on a large dataset collected by the “Manifesto
Project” (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu) we know the number of parliamentary seats
held by each political party in each European country in our study from 2002–16. In addi-
tion, this dataset includes a measure of left-right ideology for each party based on voting
behavior.n We combine both pieces of information to build our measure for governmen-
tal ideology, which we define as the weighted average of party ideologies in a government
with respect to the number of parliamentary seats held by each political party.
4 The predictive power of public debate in themedia
The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical relationship between public debate in
the media and national asylum practices in Europe. If public debate in the media indeed
influenced these decisions, we would expect at least three patterns to exist in our data.
(i) Public debate in the media should be able to explain a considerable amount of variance
in asylum acceptance rates across Europe, much more so than other control variables in-
cluded in our data. (ii) Public debate should not only explain variance, but also accurately
predict asylum acceptance rates. (iii) Finally, we would expect that public debate in the
media at time (t – 1) is strongly associated with asylum acceptance rates in time (t), but
not the other way around. This third test is fundamentally a causality test and rules out the
possibility of confounding factors that would make tests (i) and (ii) true. If this test fails
and public debate and acceptance rates were mutually predictive, then we cannot say that
public debate influences national asylum practices based on (i) and (ii).
In this section, we focus on the first two hypotheses and then separately test the causal
structure between public debate and asylum acceptance rates in the next section.We pro-
ceed as follows. First, we describe our model for predicting asylum acceptance rates with
ourmediameasures and control variables. Second, we present our findings whenwemake
in-sample predictions, which tests whether public debate can explain Europe-wide asy-
lum acceptance rate variance in our data. Finally, we present our findings when we make




Weuse amixed-effect regression design to test whether public debate in themedia can ex-
plain/predict asylum acceptance rates (see, e.g. [59] for an overview of such models). The
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mixed-effect design allows us to (i) disentangle the time-invariant and time-dependent in-
fluence of variables and (ii) mix fixed and random effects in order to maximize statistical
efficiency. Both design features are discussed below.
Defining time-invariant and time-dependent versions of all variables Why is it impor-
tant to disentangle time-invariant and time-dependent aspects of our variables? Consider
media attention in the Czech Republic and Denmark as measured in Fig. 5 (i.e., the size
of the bubble). These trends are clearly different: the Czech republic has roughly the same
degree of media attention except for 2015, while Denmark shifts from high to low to high
attention from 2002–15. Yet, the time-average is nearly the same, i.e., the average size of
the bubbles for the Czech Republic and Denmark are roughly equal. When we study the
influence ofmedia attention on asylumacceptance rates, we donotwant theCzechRepub-
lic and Denmark to be treated equally because they have the same time average. Instead,
we somehow want to capture both time-invariant features between countries and time-
dependent features that captures country-specific trends, allowing us to differentiate the
different dynamics occurring in the Czech Republic and Denmark.
We do so bymaking a distinction between a time-invariant average vs. a time-dependent




t∈T Sit is country i’smean sentiment from 2002–16. Si allows us to compare the in-
fluence of public debate across European countries (in the literature this is typically called a
‘between-effect’). Similarly, (Sit –Si) represents the quarterly-change in public debate sen-
timent. The expression (Sit – Si) allows us to understand if shifts from positive to negative
sentiment in public debate influence national-level asylum acceptance rates (in the liter-
ature this is typically called a ‘within-effect’). We include similar time-variant and time-
dependent versions of all variables in our model.
Mixed-effect setup For the sake of notation, let Rijt represent the acceptance rate of Eu-
ropean country i of asylum country j during quarter t. Let Xijt represent the correspond-
ing vector of control variables (e.g. GDP, unemployment rates, and refugee inflow). Let
Sit represent public debate sentiment in the media in European country i during quarter t.
Finally, letAit public debate attention in themedia in European country i during quarter t.
The full mixed-effect model is given as follows:
logitRijt = αi +ψj + φt + β




















We introduced a logit transformation on (Rijt ,Sit ,Ait) because Rijt , Sit , and Ait ∈ [0, 1]
per definition (see Sect. 3). In (4), (αi,ψj,φt) are dummy variables per European coun-
try (i), refugee country (j), and time period (t). β ′ is a vector of parameters for our time-
dependent control variables, (Xijt –Xij). β
′′ is a vector of parameters for our time-invariant
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A ) are parameters governing the influence of public de-
bate on acceptance rates. Finally, εijt is a normally distributed error term with mean 0 and
variance σ 2.
One issue in (4) is statistical efficiency because of the fixed-effects, (αi,ψj,φt). There
are 20 European countries, 100 asylum seekers’ countries of origin, and 60 time periods,
which amounts to 180 separate parameters to estimate.With somany parameters, we lose
statistical efficiency in estimating our model parameters and the ability to study our main






A ). We overcome this issue by instead modeling these


























φ ), rather than 180. The
key assumption here is that (αi,ψj,φt) are normally distributed. We revisit the validity
of this assumption when we look at out-of-sample predictions in Sect. 4.3. Note that we
estimate (4) and (5) with a maximum likelihood estimator.
4.1.2 Solving missing data problems:multiple imputations
One problemwemust overcome ismissing data, which is an issue in our setting. If our data
are missing because of non-random reasons, then this ‘non-randomness’ can be a source
of statistical bias [60]. This is an issue in our data because, for example, reporting refugee-
related data between 2002–2007was not obligatory, hence some countries at certain time-
points did not report data.
We avoid such bias by utilizing multiple imputations, which has been proven more ef-
fective andmore robust than the common listwise deletionmethod [61].o The basic idea is
to (i) estimate a representative distribution of our data, (ii) generate multiple ‘full’ versions
of the dataset by randomly drawing from this distribution to fill in the missing observa-
tions, and then (iii) estimate (4) and (5) utilizing each version of our dataset and combine
the results. In doing so, the final results take into account the uncertainty associated with
missing data.
Previous studies have suggested that the number of imputations should be approxi-
mately equal to the percentage of incomplete observations in the data set (a rule first
proposed by [62]). More recently, [61] and [60] proposed that the number of imputations
should equal the average percentage of missing data in those columns with any missing
data. In our case, the average percentage of missing data is 10.7%; we thus generate 11
imputations.
We combine the estimates of (4) and (5) from each imputation by using the standard
‘Rubin combination rule’ [63]. This means that: (i) the coefficients are combined using a
simple average, (ii) standard errors are combined in a way that accounts for between- and
within-variance of the estimated coefficients, and (iii) p-values are computed using the
Barnard-Rubin corrected degrees of freedom [64]. We combine p-values by combining
test estimates using Rubin’s method and then conducting inferences as normal.p
4.2 Results: in-sample predictions
With our model at hand, our first goal is to test whether public debate in the media can
explain the variance in national-level asylum acceptance rates we observe in Fig. 1(c). We
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thus estimate (4) and (5) using all of our data (i.e., via in-sample predictions). We are par-
ticularly interested in two aspects of our results: (i) the coefficients of our measures of
public debate in the media and (ii) the comparison of R2 and AICc values between models
that use our measures of public debate versus our controls.
Regarding R2, there exists a large literature on the difficulty of assessingmodel fitness for
mixed-effect models. For our purposes, we utilize two recent metrics proposed in the sta-
tistical literature [65, 66]: (i)Marginal R2, describing the proportion of variance explained
by the fixed factors alone, and (ii) Conditional R2, describing the proportion of variance
explained by both fixed and random factors. In order to combine the Marginal and Con-
ditional R2 values for each imputation, we use a method proposed by [67], which involves
transforming R2 into a z-score, averaging, and then converting back to an R2 value.
When we assess model fitness, we also report AICc and BIC in order to understand
the trade-off between explaining variance and adding more parameters in our model (this
turns out to be important below). We report our empirical estimates in Table 1.
Does public debate in the media explain acceptance rate variance? Our first question is
perhaps the most important question: do our country-specific measures of public debate
in the media explain the stark differences in national-level asylum acceptance rates across
Europe?
There are four measures in Table 1 that suggest that they do. The first two are the
Marginal and Conditional R2 values reported toward the bottom of Table 1. Recall that
the former represents the variance explained only by fixed-effects while the latter repre-
sents the variance explained by fixed-effects plus the random coefficients from (5). As is
clear in the table, introducing a normally distributed set of coefficients to represent fixed
effects provides an effective means of explaining asylum acceptance rates: Marginal R2
values range from 0.01 to 0.06, while Conditional R2 values range from 0.76 to 0.79.
The Conditional R2 values in particular suggest that a considerable amount of variance
can be explained by our media measures. With our measures described above, we can
explain up to 76% of the variance of asylum acceptance rates, which is on par with the
variance explained by all of our control variables (79%). This means that, rather than hav-
ing to look at a disparate assortment of economic and political variables to understand
national-level asylum trends, we can simply look at trends in public debate in the media
to predict asylum acceptance rates.
The final two measures reported in Table 1, namely AICc and BIC, provide further evi-
dence that our public debate measures are effective in explaining asylum acceptance rates.
AICc and BIC provide two insights. First, AICc and BIC are defined as measuring the rel-
ative amount of information lost/gained about the true underlying process by comparing
two models. Lower AICc/BIC values imply that more information is gained, i.e. a better
model has been found. Second, AICc and BIC measure the trade-off between explaining
data vs. the number of parameters in the model. This means that, if a model has a high R2
value and a high AICc/BIC, then the data has likely been over-fitted.
With this in mind, the AICc and BIC values reported in Table 1 clearly point to the ad-
vantages of our public debate measures. The regression models with only media-related
variables—including time-invariant and time-dependentmeasures ofmedia attention and
media sentiment—outperform any model that includes our control variables. Our media
models suggests that the explanatory variables offer strong predictive power and justify
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Table 1 In-sample results. Regression results for asylum acceptance rates considering public debate
in the media and economic indicators as explanatory variables. R2 values are as in [66]. Coefficients of
public debate variables represent logit-logit marginal effects. Coefficients of control variables
represent % change in odds with respect to 1 standard deviation change in variable. Small number in
parentheses below estimates represents standard error
Dep. variable: Logit (Acceptance ratesijt )
Media models Controls models Full models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mediameasures: (X ti – X
t
i )
Sentiment, refugee – baseline 0.099 –1.082
(0.078) (0.718)
Sentiment, refugee 0.462∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗
(0.035) (0.399)
Attention –0.004∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.016)
Mediameasures: X i
Sentiment, refugee 0.859∗ 0.97∗ 0.275 0.983
(0.38) (0.38) (4.515) (4.592)
Attention 0.029∗ 0.026∗ 0.322 0.314
(0.011) (0.011) (0.195) (0.203)
Time-dependent controls: (X ti – X
t
i )
Apps. received 0.023 0.01 0.001 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
GDP –0.066∗∗ –0.074∗∗ –0.072∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Gov. debt 0.124∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Unemployment 0.011 0.011 0.017
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
CPI –0.002 0.003 0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gov. ideology (left < 0 < right) –0.019 –0.009 –0.008
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Press freedom index 0.247∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Time-invariant controls: X i
Apps. received 0.08 0.038 0.018 0.016
(0.093) (0.097) (0.096) (0.095)
GDP –1.297∗∗∗ –0.812 –0.794
(0.307) (0.409) (0.394)
Gov. debt 1.503∗∗ 0.853 0.841
(0.415) (0.575) (0.55)
Unemployment –0.447∗∗ –0.451∗∗ –0.448∗∗
(0.149) (0.15) (0.149)
CPI 0.309∗ 0.316∗ 0.323∗
(0.124) (0.126) (0.122)
Gov. ideology (left < 0 < right) 0.089 0.075 0.065
(0.086) (0.09) (0.091)
Press freedom index 0.025 0.351 0.354
(0.126) (0.235) (0.232)
Num. observations 11,593 11,593 11,593 11,593 11,593 11,593
Marginal R2 0.02 0.01 >0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06
Conditional R2 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
AICc –9662 –9414 42,199 41,724 41,505 41,175
BIC –9603 –9356 42,243 41,857 41,667 41,337
Note: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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additional parameters in the model, while adding economic and political controls adds
explanatory power only by adding more parameters in the model and not from the vari-
ables themselves. These findings are reinforced when we do out-of-sample predictions
in the next subsection, where the under-performance and over-fitting of models (3–6) is
even more evident.
Having shown that mass media can explain the variance in our data, we next explore in
detail whichmeasures of public debate drive these results.
How does public debate in the media influence acceptance rates? To understand how
public debate in the media influences acceptance rates, we zoom-in on the media models
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1. What is perhaps surprising is that, for both the
time-invariant and time-dependent versions of our variables, public debate attention does
not significantly contribute to explaining national-level asylum acceptance rate variance
(in Table 1, note that the media attention coefficients are nearly zero as compared to the
media sentiment coefficients). The interpretation is that the volume of public debate is not
systematically associated with changes and trends in asylum acceptance rates. This sup-
ports previous literature, which has found that media attention is generally not sufficient
to shape political change [68].
Instead, we find that the strongest andmost significant model parameters are associated
with public debate sentiment. The emphasis on sentiment versus attention supports pre-
viousmassmedia theory, which suggests that, “[b]ecause politics is the business of problem
solving, negative news automatically turns all heads to politics expecting at least some form
of policy reaction,” [69]. In model (1), we find that a 1-unit increase in the log-odds-ratio in
public debate sentiment corresponds to a 0.462 increase in the log-odds-ratio in asylum
acceptance rates.Model (5) reports an even higher coefficient of 1.186 (this is explained by
the fact that public debate in the media is somewhat correlated with each country’s Press
Freedom Index, which means that model (1) compensates for this effect with a lower re-
ported coefficient). To gain intuition on the magnitude of this effect, suppose a European
country’s asylum acceptance rate was 50%, and overall debate sentiment in the media was
neutral with Sentiment
refugee
it = 0%. Then based on model (5), we estimate that a 5% de-
crease in quarterly media sentiment—i.e., a somewhat more negative leaning of public
debate in the media—correlates with a 3% decrease in asylum acceptance rates. In 2015,
this would have translated to a rejection of ∼30,000 asylum applications across Europe.
4.3 Results: out-of-sample predictions
Thus far, we have estimated our empirical model using (4) and (5) and all of our data. By
doing so, wewere able to understand howmuch variance could be explainedwith different
model setups. In the end, we found strong evidence that our measures of public debate in
the media explain considerable variance of asylum acceptance rates across Europe (>75%)
and is a better predictor than economic and political variables (based on differences in
AICc/BIC values between models 1, 2 and 2–6).
One interesting part of Table 1 is the stark change in AICc and BIC when we include
economic and political predictors. The results suggest that this data does not provide ad-
ditional information for the purposes of explaining asylum acceptance rates. However,
with the considerable difference between models (1, 2) vs. models (3–6), we want to fur-
ther test whether our media models are indeed the best models as suggested by AICc and
BIC.
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Table 2 Out-of-sample results. Comparison of models in Table 1 with respect to
out-of-sample-predictions. Mean square error is estimated via randomly sampling 80% of the data to
estimate the model, using the remaining 20% to test the model, and repeating 100 times. SD =
standard deviation. The best out-of-sample prediction statistics are reported in bold
Out-of-sample prediction measures
Mean absolute error Mean square error
| Predicted% – True% | (SD) (Predicted% – True%)2 (SD)
Mediamodels from Table 1
Model (1) 3.08% (0.05) 17.2 (0.6)
Model (2) 3.07% (0.1) 17.1 (0.6)
Controlmodels from Table 1
Model (3) 35.4% (0.3) 1507.4 (20.0)
Model (4) 35.4% (0.3) 1504.3 (17.7)
Fullmodels from Table 1
Model (5) 35.4% (0.3) 1504.1 (19.7)
Model (6) 35.4% (0.3) 1504.5 (17.0)
Thus, in this section we testmodels (1)–(6) bymaking out-of-sample predictions. Doing
so provides a strong indicator of over-fitting vs. under-fitting of models: over- and under-
fitted models tend to be poor at making out-of-sample predictions, while models that find
a balance between the two perform well.
We follow a standard procedure called repeated random sub-sample validation. First,
we randomly sample 80% of the data to fit our regression model (i.e., this is our training
data). Second, we utilize this model to predict the values of the remaining 20% of the data
(i.e., this is our testing data). Finally, we compare the predicted values vs. the true values
via themean absolute error (MAE)—which is the average distance between the predicted
and true values—and themean square error (MSE)—which is the average square distance
between the predicted and true value. We repeat this procedure 100 times in order to
report a mean and standard deviation of MAE andMSE for each model. We report values
in Table 2.
The results in Table 2 support those from Table 1. Using our measures of public debate
in the media, we are able to make out-of-sample predictions within 3% of true asylum
acceptance rates (on average). This is in stark contrast to models based on economic and
political predictions, which only manage to make predictions within 35% of true asylum
acceptance rates. This supports the AICc and BIC values reported in Table 1 and our
hypothesis that public debate in the media can explain and predict national-level asylum
acceptance rates across Europe.
5 Granger-causality test
Our analysis thus far has focused on explaining and predicting asylum acceptance rates
based on our measures of public debate in the media. Our results point to a strong associ-
ation between the former and latter, so much so that we can predict national-level asylum
acceptance rates across Europe with a 3% accuracy (on average). However, these analyses
are fundamentally correlation studies that cannot say whether public debate in the media
does or does not influence asylum acceptance rates. There are two reasons why. First, it
could be that asylum acceptance rates influence public debate—if so, then the strong as-
sociation is explained by public debate merely reflecting trends in national-level asylum
practices. Second, there could be unobserved variables outside of our analysis that influ-
ence both asylum acceptance rates and public debate—if so, then the strong association
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is explained by a confounding variable problem and there may not exist any causal rela-
tion between asylum acceptance rates and public debate in the media. Both reasons do
not pose an issue for explaining variance and making predictions, as in Sect. 4. But both
reasons do pose an issue if we want to understand if and how public debate in the media
influences national-level asylum acceptance rates.
In this section, we therefore employ Granger-causality tests [70] to study the causal de-
pendencies between public debate in the media and asylum acceptance rates. The test is
motivated by [28], who also utilized this test to study the causal relationship between radio
media agendas and presidential agendas. Granger-causality tests are powerful insofar as
they impose no a priori structural conditions on causal relations; instead, “[w]e merely ask
the data to tell us . . . which, if any, parameter restrictions are appropriate” [28, p. 176]. In
other words, it is the data that clarifies the causal relationship between variables.
In what follows, we first describe the data and the Granger-causality setup before pre-
senting our empirical findings.
5.1 Data
Using the Granger-causality test requires us to utilize data with a short-time scale be-
cause, to test the causal relationship between two time series, we must exclude as many
confounding variables as possible. We thus limit this analysis to the monthly data from
GDELT and on asylum acceptance decisions that are available from 2002–07.We proceed
assuming that GDP, unemployment rates and other potentially relevant variables affect
country policy on somewhat longer time scales than months (this is reasonable assump-
tion considering that countries report such metrics on a quarterly level). The focus on
2002–07 (rather than 2008–16) is due to data availability: asylum acceptance rates from
the official EU database are available at a monthly level during this time period, while all
asylum statistics after 2007 are available at the quarterly level. GDELT data is available at
the monthly level.
5.2 Granger-causality test setup
Months are denoted as t, τ = 1, 2, . . . ,T . The key relationship we are measuring is if public
debate in the media during τ ∈ [t – k, t – 1] influences asylum acceptance rates at time
t, where [t – k, t – 1] represents k-months before t. As in the main text, let Rijt represent
European country i’s acceptance rate of asylum seekers from country of origin j at time t.
We then defineModel 1 as








where the interpretation is that autoregressive terms in preceding months [t – k, t –1] are
used to explain acceptance rates in month t.
Because we found strong evidence that public debate sentiment is a strong predictor of
asylum acceptance rates in Sect. 4, we restrict our attention and scope of our Granger-
causality tests to studying this case.
As above, Sit denotes the relative sentiment of public debate for European country i in
month t, as spelled out in (2). The key idea is to test whether the autoregressive terms from
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public debate sentiment contributes toModel 1 significantly. We thus defineModel 2 as















In the manner of [70] and [28], we say that public debate sentiment helps explain asylum
acceptance rates if we find that Model 2 indeed significantly improves Model 1. Signifi-
cance is determined by a Wald test comparingModel 1 andModel 2.
As in the robust regressions, we usemultiple imputations to avoid any biases due to non-
random reasons formissing data [60], whichwould otherwise be a problem (see Sect. 4.1.2
for details). We combine the Wald test statistics from the multiple imputed datasets as a
D2 statistic as in [71] (p. 239).
In order to establishGranger-causality, we apply the same test as above but in the reverse
direction: specifically, we test whether Rijt autoregressive terms significantly contribute
to explaining (Sit – Si). The major difference in writing down these equations is that N
equations—one for each recipient country—are required while only one new variable was
introduced toModel 2. To parallel this structure, we include theaverage asylumacceptance
rate of a country as the additional variable (rather than 10 or 20 terms and their lags).
We run tests for each European country separately. We report results for the 10- and
20-highest sending refugee countries in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. As reported, we run
Table 3 Granger-causality test results. Granger-causality test of interactions between asylum
acceptance rates and public debate sentiment in the media. The 10 asylum seekers’ countries of
origin with the most decisions made (both accepted and rejected) are included in the regressions.
We report Granger-causal testing for 1-month (1-lag) and 2-month (2-lag) lagged VAR models.
Locations with NA result frommonthly data not being available from the EU database. The D2 statistic
is computed as in [71] and is the result of combining Granger tests from multiply imputed datasets
Country p-value corresponds to Wald test
Public debate sentiment → Acc. rate Acc. rate → Public debate sentiment
D2 statistic p-value D2 statistic p-value
(1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag)
Austria 12.10 8.35 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 9.72 1.66 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.20
Belgium 26.77 10.45 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 2.49 1.66 0.12 0.20
Bulgaria 12.47 16.12 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 4.08 0.55 0.04∗ 0.48
Czech Rep. 12.81 11.68 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 2.73 0.49 0.10 0.49
Denmark 13.92 11.41 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 4.71 1.10 0.03∗ 0.31
Finland 10.03 9.22 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.47 1.25 0.02∗ 0.26
France 16.44 6.03 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 16.85 5.70 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.02∗
Germany 9.04 3.31 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.07 8.75 3.82 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.05
Greece 9.92 7.14 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.10 3.61 0.75 0.06
Hungary 5.77 4.44 0.02∗ 0.05 6.92 6.72 0.01∗ 0.01∗
Italy 0.40 3.83 0.55 0.08 0.04 2.22 0.85 0.14
Netherlands 5.63 3.56 0.02∗ 0.06 4.76 2.14 0.03∗ 0.14
Norway 30.80 11.82 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 3.77 1.73 0.05 0.19
Poland 8.18 3.88 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.06 1.70 1.13 0.19 0.29
Portugal 0.42 1.02 0.52 0.34 NA 0.69 NA 0.41
Slovakia 8.81 0.45 0.42 0.50 1.79 0.60 0.18 0.44
Spain 6.45 8.39 0.01 <0.001∗∗∗ 4.32 3.54 0.04∗ 0.06
Sweden 9.25 11.44 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.86 2.45 0.02∗ 0.12
UK 21.53 12.91 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 29.04 9.72 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗
Note: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 4 Granger-causality test results with alternative specifications. Granger-causality test of
interactions between asylum acceptance rates and public debate sentiment in the media. The 20
asylum seekers’ countries of origin with the most decisions made (both accepted and rejected) are
included in the regressions. We report Granger-causal testing for 1-month (1-lag) and 2-month
(2-lag) lagged VAR models. Locations with NA result from monthly data not being available from the
EU database. The D2 statistic is computed as in [71] and is the result of combining Granger tests from
multiply imputed datasets
Country p-value corresponds to Wald test
Public debate sentiment → Acc. rate Acc. rate → Public debate sentiment
D2 statistic p-value D2 statistic p-value
(1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag) (1-lag) (2-lag)
Austria 15.55 14.00 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 7.32 1.45 0.01∗ 0.23
Belgium 38.38 29.54 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 3.26 1.09 0.07 0.30
Bulgaria 22.20 33.02 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.21 2.27 0.04∗ 0.17
Czech Rep. 49.13 27.35 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 2.53 0.18 0.11 0.67
Denmark 12.60 16.79 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 2.74 1.57 0.11 0.21
Finland 19.31 15.53 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 6.76 1.82 0.01∗ 0.18
France 19.39 9.34 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 18.59 6.58 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.01∗
Germany 18.02 6.61 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.01 8.03 2.35 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.13
Greece 10.74 19.76 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 0.07 2.44 0.80 0.12
Hungary 16.09 17.67 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 4.39 4.42 0.05 0.04∗
Italy 6.21 11.64 0.02 <0.001∗∗∗ 0.64 1.42 0.42 0.23
Netherlands 11.62 10.11 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.38 2.52 0.02∗ 0.11
Norway 33.73 29.85 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 3.88 1.37 0.05 0.24
Poland 10.89 11.46 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 1.19 0.97 0.27 0.33
Portugal 0.12 0.03 0.75 0.86 0.85 0.27 0.36 0.61
Slovakia 0.50 3.40 0.49 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.63 0.61
Spain 8.75 14.85 0.01∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.48 2.76 0.02∗ 0.10
Sweden 16.73 18.16 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 5.00 2.37 0.03∗ 0.12
UK 53.66 22.16 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 32.88 9.75 <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗
Note: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
the test for two cases: in the first we only include one lag term, or Rij(t–1) and (Si(t–1) – Si),
and in the second we include two lag terms. The latter test is more stringent than the
former test, because adding more terms to Model 1 renders it more robust to additional
explanatory terms, therebymaking itmore difficult to identify a significantD2 test statistic
when comparing Models 1 and 2.
5.3 Main results
Our main findings are surprisingly unambiguous. We find that public debate sentiment
significantly contributes to explaining asylum acceptance rates in nearly every European
country in our study. Conversely, we find essentially no statistical evidence that the reverse
effect exists: in nearly every country in our study (with the exception of the UK), asylum
acceptance rates do not help explain public debate sentiment. This trend is systematic in
both Tables 3 and 4 (with the exception of the UK). The fact that nearly all countries ex-
hibit a unilateral direction of causality is somewhat noteworthy from a Granger-causality
standpoint. The standard interpretation of such a finding is that public debate sentiment
Granger-causes asylum acceptance rates.q
These results rule out the concerns that were spelled out at the beginning of this section.
If there was an unobserved confounding variable influencing both public debate and asy-
lum acceptance rates, then we would not have observed any significant results in Tables 3
and 4. This is because adding new terms to Model 2 would have added no new informa-
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tion toModel 1, as the autoregressive terms would have already contained the information
from the driving confounding variable. On the other hand, if public debate was influenced
by asylum acceptance rates but not the other way around, then we would have observed
the opposite results from Tables 3 and 4. Instead, our results provide clear evidence that
public debate in the media influences—and is not influenced by—national-level asylum
acceptance rates. Taken together with Sect. 4, we have strong evidence that public debate
is indeed being heard at the policy level.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our study was motivated by the observation that—despite the 1951 Geneva Convention,
several follow-up international conventions, and a Europe-wide consensus on citizen pref-
erences towards migration (vis-à-vis measured in [18])—we observe significant national-
level variation in asylum practices across Europe. One might expect that European coun-
tries would have converged on asylum practices, giving equal and judicious treatment of
asylum applications in a unified way. However, real-world data suggests the opposite. For
nearly every asylum-sending country, national-level asylum acceptance rates differ widely
across Europe.
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that public debate in the media can explain much of
the variation in asylum practices across Europe. Our data-driven analysis draws on a com-
prehensive collection of refugee-related news articles (GDELT) and data on 20 European
countries, 100 asylum countries of origin, all spanning 2002–16. By taking a Europe-wide
perspective, we incorporate many different types of media outlets, thereby many differ-
ent possible mechanisms that could drive public debate in the media such as the media’s
own agenda, media moguls, interest groups, citizens’ opinions, and governmental efforts
to engender public support for policies. While it is beyond the scope of this study to adju-
dicate between different explanations for the divergence in public debate in the media we
observe, our quantitative findings nevertheless suggest that refugee-related public debate
in the media is highly indicative of variation in asylum practices.
We find three clear patterns in the data. First, we find that public debate in the media is
strongly predictive of European asylum acceptance rate, accounting for nearly 80% of the
variation. It turns out that changes in public debate sentiment explains most of this varia-
tion, much more so than social, economic and political variables captured in our dataset.
Second, by combining different measures of public debate in the media, we can make out-
of-sample predictionswithin 3%of true asylum acceptance rates (on average). Third, going
beyond correlation analyses, we study the causal relationship between public debate sen-
timent and asylum acceptance rates via Granger-causality tests with monthly-level data.
This offers two advantages: (i) we can rule out many possible confounding factors, espe-
cially those that might induce spurious correlations with our quarterly-level analyses, and
(ii) it gives us further evidence that public debate is not only associated with national-level
asylum acceptance rates, but also contains distinct signals that seem to set a precedence
for European asylum practices (we want to emphasize that this is not causal evidence per
se, rather, it is statistical evidence that points in this direction).
How canwe understand the strong predictive power of ourmedia-basedmeasurements,
especially in light of the weak predictive power of structural socio-economic and politi-
cal indicators? Past literature offers a few insights. For example, a study analyzing the US
found that hostile policy-level debate toward immigrants is most likely to take place when
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communities undergo sudden demographic changes at the same time that news rhetoric
politicizes immigration [56]. In other words, the study suggests that the news media offer
some type of trigger that builds on sudden demographic stress in a community. Building
on this idea, [72] found that German civil servants who are making the asylum applica-
tions decisions are more influenced by regional sentiment toward refugees than manage-
ment directives. Taken together, these studies suggest that public debate in the media—
influenced by sudden demographic stress and regional sentiment—can influence asylum
acceptance rates directly via civil servants. This is one among several mechanisms that
could theoretically explain our results; testing each is left for future work.
We pursued a comparative cross-national research design in order to gain a Europe-
wide perspective on the empirical relationship between public debate in the media and
asylum practices. This advantage, however, comes at the cost of not being able to adju-
dicate between country-specific mechanisms that drive public debate in the media. This
opens up several interesting avenues for future work. Given data on party deliberations
and country-level policy processes, for example, it should be possible to test whether the
media indeed serves as a conduit for governments to promote specific asylum policies. In
addition, it would be particularly interesting to study the role of socialmedia platforms, for
example, whether social media polarizes public debate about issues such as asylum prac-
tices and, therefore, contributes to shaping the asylum policy-making process. Another
avenue is studying the effect of international versus national public debate on refugees,
as well as the effect of different media outlets (such as the New York Times versus CNN)
[73]. Finally, another interesting avenuewould be examiningmore detailed data on refugee
inflow in order to study the extent to which heterogeneity of refugee profiles across Eu-
rope has shapedmedia coverage indirectly. It is likely that wealthy, educated refugees have
better prospects of integrating into society more easily, and perhaps less noticeably, than
refugees coming from other backgrounds. If public debate in the media is spurred by so-
cial tensions (as suggested by past literature), then European countries that received the
latter profile of refugees might have exhibited stronger (and more negative) debates dur-
ing the European refugee crisis than countries that received more refugees of the former
profile. As such, heterogeneity in refugee profiles across Europe could also contribute to
the patterns we observe in our study.
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Endnotes
a Note that the numbers in Fig. 1 only pertain to asylum applications submitted and not the total number of asylum
seekers hosted by a country. For example, Germany reported over 1 million asylum seekers having arrived in 2015,
yet less than 500,000 submitted applications [15].
b It is perhaps worth noting that the current refugee situation has spurred considerable financial commitments from
international organizations and countries alike. For example, the UNHCR alone invests more than $1.8 billion in
cash-based interventions and assistance (see, e.g. https://www.unhcr.org/5c5c5acc4).
c We restrict our analysis to those 20 European countries for which comprehensive asylum statistics are available. For
a full list of countries see Fig. 5 or Table 3.
d A poll in the UK in 2004, for example, found that 71% of voters believed that asylum seekers were receiving priority
in provision of public services over citizens [35].
e See [74] for a detailed discussion of individual-level requirements in the case of Sri Lanka Tamil applicants in the late
1980s.
f [75, 76], credited as the first to study the link between the media and refugees, took a close look at how the media
evolved as Tamil asylum seekers arrived in Western European countries in 1985. van Dijk found two distinct trends
that have been confirmed by subsequent case studies [35, 38, 77–80]: (i) the media tended to refer to asylum
seekers as a collective rather than individually, and (ii) initial positive discourse eventually declined into language
that instantiated threat of ‘self’ and ‘our territory.’
g See, e.g., [81] for an analysis of protests using GDELT.
h https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34183150
i In the GDELT database, this measure is equivalent to column ‘NumArticles’.
j In the GDELT database, this measure is equivalent to column ‘AvgTone’.
k We gathered the data in January 2017.
l According to the EU meta-documentation, the number of asylum application acceptances is: “. . . the sum of
decisions granting refugee status, subsidiary protection status, authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons (for
countries where applicable) and temporary protection.”
m Formally, the number of asylum applications accepted is the ‘total positive decisions’ made regarding asylum seeking
applications. According to the EU meta-documentation, a positive decision refers to, “. . . the sum of decisions
granting refugee status, subsidiary protection status, authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons (for countries where
applicable) and temporary protection.” Accordingly, a rejected asylum application refers to those that received a
‘negative decision.’
n This ideology score is updated annual based on past voting behavior; see the information at the Manifesto Project
website.
o We implement multiple imputations by using the Amelia II algorithm for R written by [82], which implements a
multivariate normal multiple imputation and employs a bootstrapping EM-maximizer to take draws from the
posterior distribution.
p It is important to note that Rubin’s original methods assumes the degrees of freedom for the complete data is
infinite. In our case study, the sufficiently high number of observations makes this assumption valid.
q A reader has perhaps noted that no coefficients from the regressions are reported. This is because individual
coefficients are not readily interpretable as terms autoregressive terms are highly correlated, which yields biased
coefficients. However, R2 terms remain robust with maximum likelihood or OLS estimators. Therefore, in our
analyses, we rely solely on model significance and not on βτ or γτ coefficient interpretations—the former is
sufficient for establishing Granger-causality.
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